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Introduction
A continuing question in financial economics is why initial public offerings (IPOs) are underpriced. Underpricing is persistent and economically significant, especially so in certain periods. For example, Loughran and Ritter (2004) report that, in the years 1999 and 2000, issuers in initial public offerings could expect to see their stock price rise 65% on the first day of trading.
1 This represents a shocking loss to issuing firms, who leave a substantial portion of their value "on the table" when accessing the public capital markets.
A popular family of theories attempting to explain this phenomenon revolves around asymmetric information: in both the "winner's curse" (Rock (1986) ) and "information cascade" (Welch (1992) ) models, uninformed investors must be induced to participate in the offering via a first day discount. 2 The more uncertainty surrounding an offering, the greater the IPO discount. A question for these theories, and the empirical papers that corroborate them, is why do issuers not attempt to remedy these costly informational asymmetries by making more and fuller disclosure about themselves? After all, the Securities Act of 1933 mandates a particular vehicle of disclosure, in the form of the statutory public offering prospectus. If costly underpricing is the result of a dearth of information, we should expect to see issuers making as much prospectus disclosure as possible.
In this paper, I provide support for these theories and suggest a causal mechanism for why prospectus disclosure does not eliminate information asymmetry. I find that (1) consistent with the asymmetric information theories, U.S. IPO underpricing is a negative function of the amount of prospectus disclosure, and (2) the amount of prospectus disclosure may be limited by threat of subsequent legal liability. 1 The IPO market in 1999 and 2000 was quite extreme in this regard. In contrast, the average underpricing in the random sample of IPOs utilized in this paper, drawn from 1997 to 2005, is 23.5% --still a large number. But underpricing does vary according to time period examined. 2 In the winner's curse model, informational asymmetry exists in the secondary market between "informed" and "uninformed" investors. Uninformed investors will tend to lose out to informed investors in auctions to purchase securities: if informed investors know the securities offered are of relatively high quality, they purchase at the offering price, and if they believe them to be of low quality, they will abstain. This means that uninformed investors are more likely to purchase securities that are overpriced -i.e., they suffer a winner's curse. In order to get uninformed investors to participate -which may be necessary for a large offering where there are not enough informed investors to buy all the shares -issuers must offer a discount such that uninformed investors will, in expectation, at least break even, thus counteracting the winner's curse. Informed investors enjoy rents on their informational advantage.
In the information cascade model, investors look to see whether other investors have purchased the securities, or not, at a given price. Whether an investor has purchased is itself information, as it reveals the investor's private information about the value of the securities. Thus a cascading effect can ensue, where if enough investors purchase, the inference other investors draw will be sufficiently positive that they will purchase without regard to their own private information. The converse may happen as well: if prior investors did not purchase, then subsequent investors will draw a strong negative inference and may rationally abstain from the offering. Thus, to ensure a positive cascade and the success of the offering, issuers may choose to underprice, which increases the probability that early offerees will in fact purchase.
In order to show that IPO underpricing is a function of publicly available information, I use an objective metric of the information available to the public market: IPO prospectus wordcounts. These wordcounts are taken by section, to account for the fact that some prospectus information is positive (in that it should induce investors to want to buy the stock) while some information is negative (in that it consists of warnings about risk that have, under law, a protective effect against subsequent lawsuits). In particular, I count "risk factor" disclosure as negative, 3 and everything else as positive (although of varying importance).
This metric has distinct advantages over others used in past studies. First, prior to the SEC's 2005 reforms, 4 the IPO prospectus is the only sanctioned means of making written disclosures in the period leading up to the IPO. All other written communications, including conversations with journalists that are subsequently published, count as illegal offers of securities and can lead to the offering being cancelled or to draconian liability. 5 Second, prospectus wordcounts are objective; there is no need to assemble an arbitrary index or to subjectively code, which can introduce bias into the results. Finally, there is reason to believe that prospectus disclosures have significant bite: issuing firms are strictly liable for material misstatements that may lead investors to overvalue the firm, while the inclusion of so-called "risk factor" disclosures has the wellrecognized legal effect of forestalling liability in relation to the subject risk.
As it turns out, this metric of information proves to have very a significant correlation with IPO underpricing. A firm that makes one standard deviation more disclosure tends to experience about a third less underpricing. Additionally, as a more direct test of information content, disclosure is highly correlated with subsequent market depth and trading volatility.
Further, the fact that firms are liable for IPO disclosure means that this disclosure is costly. This helps to explain why underpricing due to asymmetric information persists instead of being rectified by more disclosure (in contrast, most other explanations rely on some presumably implicit, and often undefined, market failure 6 ). Liability for 3 The disclosure regulations mandate a separate "risk factor" section that contains detailed warnings about things that might go wrong with the issuer. Courts have given these risk factors a legal prophylactic effect against liability through what is known as the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which is essentially that if the issuer warns investors about a risk, the issuer cannot be held liable when and if that risk subsequently comes to pass. See, e.g., in re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation -Taj Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d 357 (3 rd Circ. 1993) . 4 In 2005, the SEC finalized rules permitting "free writing prospectuses," which allows issuers to use written marketing materials subject to relatively few constraints. 5 For instance, the internet media company Wired Ventures canceled its planned IPO when an internal memo, praising the company's future prospects, was leaked to the financial media. See Deborah Lohse and Joan Rigdon, Wired kills IPO amid mishap with email, The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1996. [also Webvan example]. 6 As Schrand and Verrecchia (2005) note, studies that "examine the impact of costly signals on IPO underpricing, such as underwriter quality or retained ownership, are effectively predicated on the assumption that the prospectus is not a sufficient tool to reduce information asymmetry." misstatements under the Securities Act not only provides credibility, 7 but also gives rise to a testable hypothesis: firms that face, ex ante, a greater likelihood of litigation should choose to make more negative (risk factor) disclosures, and less disclosure of a positive nature. As predicted, a significant relationship exists: firms that make more risk factor disclosure suffer more IPO-related lawsuits. This is consistent with a model in which risk factor disclosure is of diminishing marginal benefit in preventing litigation, or where risk factor disclosures limit damages.
All in all, these preliminary results suggest that prospectus disclosure may be an important component in the informational completeness of an offering, and, further, that there is a link between disclosure and IPO underpricing and between disclosure and subsequent litigation. It appears plausible that one of the costs of securities litigation may be IPO underpricing, since firms that believe they will be sued tend to disclose less and, consequently, face a greater discount on their shares. While at the current state of this project cannot show causality -and cannot dismiss, for instance, the possibility that IPO underpricing and prospectus disclosure are jointly determined by baseline uncertainty -the results are certainly suggestive, and future versions of this paper will attempt to identify causality.
In Part 1, I provide a review of IPO disclosure mechanics and liability, and then state the main hypotheses that I will be testing in this paper. In Part 2, I briefly discuss prior literature that has addressed questions of public offering disclosure and IPO underpricing. In Part 3, I describe my data and coding methodology. In Part 4, I present summary statistics. In Part 5, I examine the determinants of IPO disclosure. In Part 6, I present evidence that IPO disclosure affects both underpricing and informational completeness, while in Part 7, I examine the robustness of this result. In Part 8, I provide evidence that IPO disclosure affects the likelihood of subsequent IPO-related securities class action lawsuits. Part 9 concludes.
Institutional Background and Hypotheses

A. A very brief primer on the IPO process
In this subsection, I describe the law regulating IPOs. In summary, the effect of the law is that the prospectus will contain much or even all of the information about a firm that is publicly available at the time of the IPO. This means that the prospectus ought to be an important measure of informational completeness.
Any offer or sale of a security must either be registered with the SEC or else fit under an exemption; otherwise, the offer and sale is illegal under §5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"). This applies to any security, offered anywhere in the world, to any person. For an issuer of securities that wishes to access the public markets and to have widespread secondary trading of the security without restriction, registration is generally the only option. Registration requires filing with the SEC a registration statement that contains a prospectus, which is ultimately intended for distribution to offerees and purchasers. The prospectus must contain disclosure on numerous specific subjects, as mandated in the applicable registration forms and SEC Regulations S-K and S-X. In addition, Rule 408 of the Securities Act requires issuing firms to disclose in a prospectus "such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."
At the same time that the Securities Act requires inclusion of all material information about an issuer in the prospectus, it also significantly limits disclosures outside of the prospectus. As interpreted by the SEC, the Securities Act prohibits any publicity outside of the prospectus that may "condition the market" for the issuer's shares prior to the offering; this is, in effect, an almost complete informational blackout, with very limited exceptions for operationally necessary or ordinary course of business publicity, such as product advertising or continuing investor relations.
8 Violation of this blackout (even unintentionally) gives any recipient of the illegal offer the right to sell the share back to the issuer at the offering price.
9 Conditioning the market is illegal even if issuers have yet to start the formal IPO process, and hence there are few explicit conduits for delivering information to investors outside of the statutory prospectus. This means that, in theory, the firm's public offering price will be based largely or even entirely upon the disclosures that it makes in its IPO prospectus.
10 If the law works the way it is supposed to, the information in the prospectus should be representative of the publicly available information about the issuer overall, and issuers have a strong incentive to disclose as much positive information about themselves as possible, as this should help to overcome adverse selection and raise the price of the shares. 8 Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it illegal to sell or offer securities prior to the filing of a registration statement with the SEC. "Offer" is defined broadly under Section 2 of the Securities Act to include virtually any information released by the issuer or its agents with a view toward encouraging investors to purchase the issuer's securities. See SEC Releases 3844 and 5180. Subsequent to filing of the registration statement, written offers may only be made via the prospectus contained in the registrations statement, and oral offers are subject to liability under Section 12(a)(2). In rare cases, significant information or "buzz" may exist about a pre-IPO firm. By way of example, Google appeared to rely largely on its pre-existing reputation to market its shares to investors directly, without the use of a traditional underwriter, and was rather reluctant to disclose additional information in the IPO itself. Given the dramatic post-offering price appreciation of Google's shares, Google's attempt to eschew the traditional underwriting process was at best a limited success. 9 If the SEC catches the illegal offer prior to the offering, it has discretion to stop the offering or, more commonly, to require inclusion of the offending information in the prospectus, along with a risk factor warning that recipients of illegal offers may have a right of rescission against the issuer. Failure to include this warning would, in itself, constitute an illegal omission of material information. 10 Other communications, such as roadshows, are allowed at certain times, but these communications are also subject to strict liability, under Section 12 of the Securities Act (subject to a reasonable care defense). So-called "free-writings" (written materials that accompany a final Section 10(a) prospectus and are subject to fraud liability) are only available post-effectiveness, subsequent to pricing.
There are significant potential costs to positive disclosure -indeed, these costs are presumably what makes prospectus disclosure credible. Under the Securities Act, the issuing firm (along with, subject to a due diligence defense, the underwriter, the accountants, and the issuer's directors and officers) is strictly liable for any material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement or prospectus.
11
As this liability standard applies to omissions as well as affirmative misstatements, issuers can and often are liable for failing to disclose potential risks that subsequently materialize. The SEC requires a specific section of the prospectus to contain "risk factors," where the issuer makes disclosure about any number of potential risks that the firm faces. Disclosed risk factors have a prophylactic effect against liability; under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, issuers cannot be held liable where it gave a sufficient warning about a risk that subsequently materializes and causes the stock price to decline. Risk factor disclosure is then, in a sense, negative information, since it negates an implicit warranty or guarantee that may otherwise give an investor confidence in the veracity of the issuer's positive disclosures. Anecdotally, firms facing low risk and with high confidence in their future prospects, such as the Kraft Foods IPO, signal their information by making relatively little risk factor disclosure.
B. An informal model and testable hypotheses
Presumably, the reason that issuers make positive disclosure is to raise the price at which they may sell their shares. This would be consistent with the winner's curse or information cascade theories of IPO underpricing. While more disclosure should in this sense decrease the firm's cost of capital, there are offsetting costs, such as potential legal liability for making material misstatements or omissions. We should expect that where, ceteris paribus, firms disclose more, the probability of encountering a legal or other sanction is higher as a consequence. Conversely, a firm that faces a higher exogenous probability of litigation will choose to disclose less, protecting itself by disclosing a greater amount of negative risk factor disclosure.
Consider, for example, a medical device company that intends to go public, which has several projects underway that management believes are very promising, if still nascent. Suppose further that some investors in the marketplace are relatively wellinformed about the good prospects of these projects. If the company were to make substantial and detailed disclosures about these projects -even though this information is already known to the informed investors -uninformed investors would be at less of an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the informed investors, and would have less fear of suffering a winner's curse. Hence the uninformed investors would be more willing to 11 A misstatement or omission is deemed "material" if it is something that a reasonable investor would have considered important to her investment decision; in short, if it is something investors should care about, it is material. The concept of "materiality" is defined by Rule 405 of the Securities Act, which states that "the term 'material' … [refers] to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining to purchase the security…." The measure of damages if the plaintiff shows a material misstatement or omission is the initial offering price of the securities, less the price at the time of suit. This assumes that the plaintiff satisfies the "causation" element of securities fraud, which is that the misstated or omitted information actually caused her losses. participate in the offering and pay a higher price for its shares, meaning that the degree of IPO underpricing would be reduced. At the same time, however, making these positive disclosures would increase the likelihood that, should things turn out badly, the company will be successfully sued. Plaintiffs would be able to claim that the positive disclosures were misleading or failed to state risks that might lead the projects to fail. In contrast, not making the disclosure -or being less positive or issuing more warnings about the likelihood of failure -would tend to reduce this prospective liability. Ultimately, then, the medical device company would have to balance the benefit of reduced IPO underpricing against the cost of increased risk of liability when choosing whether to make any particular positive disclosure.
One can model formally such a disclosure decision. Suppose that a firm can choose how much disclosure to make, (0,1] r ∈ . The term r is a negative measure of disclosure, where r = 1 is the minimum disclosure possible, and r approaching 0 is the maximum. Under a system like that in the U.S., a firm faces some prior probability p of litigation; while a higher r reduces the firm's expected penalty of litigation, 12 it also exacerbates the problem of informational asymmetry and causes a greater loss of IPO proceeds to underpricing. For concreteness, we can write the firm's expected payoff from the offering as a particular function of r: log U p r ar = − , where p is the prior probability of suit, logr is the measure of expected damages, a > 0 is a measure of the informational asymmetry that exists regarding the firm, and ar represents the expected loss due to first day underpricing. The firm maximizes its expected payoff according to the first order condition / r p a = . Hence, risk factor (negative) disclosure is increasing in the probability of suit, and decreasing in the prior degree of informational asymmetry. Stating it in terms of positive disclosure, firms will disclose more when they face a lower incidence of suit and when the degree of informational asymmetry is higher.
Therefore, if underpricing is a function of informational asymmetry, then the following hypotheses should be supported in the data:
1. Underpricing should be lower, ceteris paribus, when firms disclose more positive information and/or less negative risk factor information.
2. Firms that are more likely to be sued disclose less (i.e., less positive information and more negative risk factor disclosure).
Prior literature on information and underpricing
A vast finance and accounting literature explores IPO underpricing. Ritter & Welch (2003) and Ljungqvist (2006) provide good surveys of work on the phenomenon, for which theories abound. Following the taxonomy of Ritter & Welch (2003) , the theories that deal with disclosure and/or legal liability fall generally into two categories, those in which information is equally shared (symmetric information), and those in which agents are differentially informed (asymmetric information).
The principal symmetric information theory of underpricing relevant here is that issuers and underwriters underprice in order to avoid subsequent legal liability for misstatements in the IPO prospectus (Tinic (1988) , Hughes and Thakor (1992) ). Section 11 of the Securities Act does not allow a lawsuit where the price of the securities has not declined below the offering price, and hence reducing the offering price may insure against subsequent suit. One problem with this theory, as pointed out by Alexander (1993) , is that Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, which is also applicable to IPO prospectuses, does allow lawsuits where a subsequent purchaser has lost money due to a fraudulent misstatement, even where the securities price has not declined below the initial offering price. Also, as Ritter and Welch (2003) note, reducing the offering price to avoid liability for declines in price, where the damages are based upon the price decline, is unlikely to be efficient unless there is some greater penalty inflicted. Casting further doubt on this theory, studies such as Keloharju (1993) show that the phenomenon of underpricing exists even in markets that have little, if any, IPO-related litigation. Lowry and Shu (2002) do, however, find evidence that litigation risk does affect underpricing in the United States, and suggest that underpricing may arise from litigation risk as well as from other sources.
There are two principal asymmetric information theories. First, issuers may use underpricing as a signal of hidden value (underpricing is equivalent to burning money) and attempt to these recoup losses through subsequent securities issues (Welch (1989) ). However, Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) , examined seasoned offerings directly, and found that seasoned equity offering behavior is better explained by other factors, and that underpricing qua signal has relatively little explanatory power.
Second, informational disparities may exist among investors such that underpricing is the result of investors' rational fear of a "winner's curse" (Rock (1986) ). Alternatively, investors may be only partially informed regarding other investors' demand for the securities, and hence each investor's purchase decision is a signal of value to others (an "information cascade") (Welch (1992) ). Too high a price would prevent investors from revealing their information by purchasing shares. Several studies test this theory by examining the effects of information upon underpricing. Verrecchia & Schrand regress pre-IPO publicity 13 against first day underpricing, and find a marginally significant negative correlation. Strom (2006) studies the link between non-financial disclosure and first day IPO underpricing. He constructs an index of Swedish IPO disclosure and finds that, while Swedish IPOs do suffer from first day underpricing, there is no significant link between non-financial prospectus disclosure and the degree of underpricing.
14 Beatty & Welch (1996) examine the relationship of risk factor disclosure, other signals of risk (such as insider share retention), expert 15 compensation, and expert quality. They find a positive relationship between the number of risk factors and the degree of first day underpricing, although this result is significant only for a subset of firms, and not robust when controlling for factors such as industry and year.
Two contemporaneous working papers also address the topic of IPO underpricing and disclosure. Arnold, Fishe & North (2008) use an ambiguity measure of hard to soft information, and find that this measure correlates significantly with first day underpricing as well as longer term returns. Hanley & Hoberg (2008) collect data on several sections of IPO prospectuses and find that these predict between a three and seven percent change in IPO underpricing. These papers and mine reach a similar conclusion regarding the relation between more disclosure and IPO underpricing, although they do not investigate a causal mechanism and do not explain why, assuming the relation is causal, firms simply do not disclose more to reduce underpricing. In particular, some key difference between the my paper and theirs is that I show evidence of a causal mechanism (litigation risk affects disclosure), that disclosure relates directly to measures of informational completeness, and that the effects of disclosure appear more concentrated in certain time periods and industries.
Data
A. A methodology for measuring disclosure
The disclosure data in this paper comes from IPO prospectuses which, by law, must be filed with the SEC and which are available electronically from 1997 onward at the SEC's EDGAR website. In particular, I look at the informational content of Rule 424 prospectuses (the Rule 424 prospectus is generally the final prospectus, which includes pricing information) that an issuer of securities files with the SEC as close as possible to the time at which the offering of securities is completed and the securities begin to trade on the public markets.
In order to have an objective methodology to measure the degree of information disclosed, I gathered word counts, page counts, and heading counts (for risk factors) of the various prospectus sections.
One refinement is that the prospectus (not including the financial pages) may be divided into two parts: the "risk factor" section, which is required under law and which describes risks that the company may face down the road, and everything else. Risk factors have a prophylactic effect under the law: under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, a firm may not be successfully sued under the Securities Act of 1933 if the plaintiffs' losses occurred because of the materialization of a risk that was disclosed and adequately described in the risk factor section of the prospectus. 17 Otherwise, an issuer of securities is strictly liable for any material misstatement or omission in the prospectus.
Thus, risk factor disclosure is considered "negative" disclosure, whereas everything else is "positive" disclosure. It is not necessarily clear how to weight the one versus the other -i.e., how much positive disclosure does a unit of risk factor disclosure cancel out? -so I test several different specifications.
B. Data sources
Using the NASDAQ's online list of IPOs (itself taken from Edgar-Online (a forprofit site that codes and collates SEC filing information from the SEC's EDGAR site))
18 , I compiled a list of all public offerings from January 1, 1997 through July 1, 2005, from which a random sample of 90 offerings from each year were drawn (except for 2005, where all 45 IPOs through July 1 2005 were used). Data on prospectus wordcounts, number and identity of underwriters, SIC codes, and amount of proceeds were then collected from the SEC's EDGAR website. After removing observations that do not appear on CRSP, 19 747 observations remain.
Data were then collected on analyst research reports from InvesText for the years 1998 and 2003 only due to time limitations. The years 1998 and 2003 were chosen as they span both the market collapse of 2001 and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. From the Stanford Securities Class Action Database, information was coded on whether the firm was sued subsequent to the offering, the time of the suit, and whether the suit was explicitly IPO-related.
Using ticker symbols and CUSIPs, this data was then merged with data from the SDC Platinum New Issues database, which gives data on price and the composition of the firm's underwriting and sponsorship. A significant number of observations had no match in the SDC database; this is because SDC does not count many capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of preferred stock, and spin-offs as new public issues. 20 Further, SDC omits pricing and other data for many offerings, without explanation. After the merge with SDC, I have 628 observations (although subject to some SDC spottiness which can reduce the sample size), and 134 observations with analyst coverage data.
For these 628 observations, I obtained data on bid-ask spreads and market depth from the WRDS TAQ database. Financial statement data (from the issuer's first annual report as a public company) comes from Compustat; incompleteness in the Compustat data reduces the sample size to 476 when those data are used.
Summary statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the chief dependent and explanatory variables used in my analysis. First day underpricing is the offering-day run-up in share price. IPO related lawsuit is equal to 1 if the issuer experiences an IPO related lawsuit, zero otherwise, coded from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinhouse. Total prospectus wordcount is the number of words in the prospectus, not counting the financial pages. Summary wordcount is the number of words in the summary section, which presents concisely the prime selling points of the offering. Risk factor wordcount is the number of words in the risk factor section. Risk factor headings is the number of subject headings in the risk factor section. Venture backed takes the value 1 if the issuer was backed by a venture capital firm, zero otherwise. The number of underwriters in the offering is the number of underwriters participating in the offering, as listed in the prospectus. Offering proceeds is the total proceeds raised in the offering. Reported revenues take the value 1 if the issuer has reported revenues prior to the offering, zero otherwise. Table 2 gives the breakdown of industry offerings by year; industry codes correspond to the Fama-French 5 Industry classification system available from Kenneth French's website. 21 I utilize the 5-industry classification (as opposed to a greater number of industry categories) as it provides a greater ability to measure within-year and withinindustry variation. This does, however, come at the cost of greater heterogeneity within industry classifications. For this reason, some specifications make use of 2 digit SIC codes in order to ensure that results do not derive from intra-classification heterogeneity. As one might expect, the years 1998 to 2000 show an increasing number of hightech offerings (Industry 3), which fall off sharply in 2001 as the market revises its expectations regarding internet and telecom companies. Figure 1 presents the likelihood of being sued in relation to the IPO according to the year in which the issuer went public. Clearly, firms going public in the "bubble years" of 1999 and 2000 had a much greater likelihood of being sued. This is true for firms across the board in the sample (for example, consumer goods firms going public in these years were sued 39% of the time, as opposed to 37% for high tech), although high tech firms are disproportionately likely to have gone public in 1999 or 2000. Figure 2 gives a graph of summary word count, 22 risk factor word counts, and the number of risk factor headings over time. Prospectuses, in general, have gotten wordier. There is, however, a noticeable dip in summary word counts, and a hump in risk factor wordcounts, in the years 1999 and 2000. As the next table (Table 3) shows, this appears to line up an increase in high tech offerings in 1999 and 2000. Disclosure tends to vary by industry, and this correlates with litigation. Table 3 gives disclosure and litigation breakdowns by industry. It is apparent that high-tech firms (F-F industry 3) are sued rather more often than firms of other industries. They also have less disclosure than firms of other industries, as measured by the ratio in Columns V. One possible cause of this inter-industry difference is the way in which the securities disclosure regime accommodates risk. It has long been thought that potential securities law liability "chills" much useful disclosure (e.g., Kripke (1964) ) where issuers are afraid of overbearing liability for positive disclosure. Healthcare (industry 4) does not seem to follow this pattern, pairing low disclosure with a relatively low probability of suit; however, from Table 2 it appears that healthcare firms were likely to go public postbubble, which may present somewhat different disclosure and litigation environment. Table 4 presents the results of a multivariate regression of measures of disclosure against offering and firm characteristics. Column 1 regresses the logged ratio of summary wordcount to risk factor wordcount against variables representing characteristics of the offering and the issuer. Column 2 adds two variables realized only after the offering (logged assets from the first annual report and the standard deviation of daily returns for the first 250 trading days post-IPO). While these variables are not observable until after the offering is complete, I include them here because they arguably proxy for observable risk at the time of the offering, and hence they are of some interest. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the specification of Column 2, but for the dependent variables of logged summary wordcount and logged risk factor wordcount, respectively. Breaking the dependent variables out in this way provides some idea of the differential effects of offering characteristics upon positive and negative disclosure. Several things here are notable. the bigger the offering amount (logged offering proceeds), the more disclosure must be made (Column 1). This is consistent with a winner's curse type model in which relatively uninformed purchasers become more important to the offering's success as the size of the offering grows: there are simply not enough informed traders to buy up those offerings for which substantial information asymmetries exist. Upon including our imperfect proxies for uncertainty (log assets and standard deviation of daily return) in Column 2, the effect of the size of the offering disappears, which is also consistent with this explanation. Venture backing has a significant effect upon the total level of disclosure, tending to decrease positive disclosure (Column 3) and increase negative disclosure (Column 4). This might mean that firms with venture backing have a certification effect such that the benefits of disclosure are reduced.
Determinants of disclosure
The measures of risk do, as predicted, have a differential effect upon positive and negative disclosure: the coefficient for log assets is positive in Column 3 (though not significant) and negative in Column 4 (significant at 1%), while the coefficient for standard deviation of daily returns is negative in Column 3 (significant at 1%) and positive in Column 4 (not significant). This suggests that riskier firms tend to disclose less overall information, reducing the positive information that they disclose. This result must, of course, be interpreted with caution since ex post return volatility may itself be affected by IPO disclosure policy.
Issuers that are in high tech or healthcare industries appear to disclose significantly less overall, even controlling for size and ex post risk. Both industries disclose less positive information (summary wordcount) and more negative information (risk factor wordcount) (Columns 3 and 4). Since this specification controls for return variance, there appears to be something special about these industries aside from risk that affects disclosure policy.
Relation of Disclosure to Underpricing and Information Asymmetry
A. First Day Underpricing
If first day underpricing arises due to informational asymmetries, as in the winner's curse or information cascade theories, one would expect to see that first day underpricing is a function of prospectus disclosure. This relation should be negative, so long as we are able to control relatively well for ex ante uncertainty regarding the offering (controls for offering size, industry, and year may perform some of this function).
23 More particularly, underpricing should be a negative function of non-risk factor disclosures (i.e., positive information), and a positive function of risk factor disclosures (i.e., negative information, since it disclaims the positive information). Underpricing should also be a positive function of the ratio of positive to negative disclosure.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure reduces uncertainty, and that less uncertainty leads to less underpricing. Positive disclosure is very strongly correlated with less underpricing. This correlation is statistically significant and surprisingly large. Additionally, as predicted, risk factor disclosure is correlated with a greater degree of underpricing, though this result is not as large or as significant.
To begin with a simple univariate analysis, Figure 2 .1 graphs underpricing versus disclosure decile, where disclosure is defined as the ratio of non-risk factor to risk factor disclosure (measured in wordcounts). There is a clear pattern: as firms disclose more positive/less negative information in their IPO prospectuses, the degree of 1 st day underpricing declines. The lowest decile of disclosure firms experience underpricing of just over 40%, while the highest decile has underpricing of about 8%. 
Disclosure Decile 1st Day Underpricing
To see whether this relation holds more generally, Table 5 presents results of multivariate regressions of underpricing upon disclosure and a set of offering and issuer characteristics. These results bear out the relation between disclosure and underpricing apparent in Figure 2 .1. Column I gives the most reduced form of the model, with a regression of 1 st day underpricing (measured as the percent by which the offering rose on the first day of trading) against the log of summary wordcount (positive disclosure) and the log of risk factor wordcount (negative disclosure). As predicted, more positive information is associated with less underpricing, while more negative information is associated with more underpricing. The coefficient for positive information is very highly significant (the t statistic is above 8), as is that for negative information (a t statistic of 2.6). The economic effect is also large: a one standard deviation increase in logged summary wordcount (.56) corresponds to a decrease in underpricing of 14.5 percentage points. A one standard deviation increase in logged risk factor wordcount (.41) corresponds to a 4.7 percentage point increase in underpricing. As average underpricing in this sample is 22.7%, these effects are very large. Column II controls for several offering and issuer characteristics that may conceivably influence first day underpricing. The controls are: a dummy for whether the offering was venture capital backed, the log number of underwriters on the deal, the dollar amount of proceeds in the offering, a dummy for the hot IPO years of 1999 and 2000, and a dummy for whether the issuer was in a high tech industry (Fama French industry classification 3). Summary wordcount remains negative and very highly significant, and risk factor wordcount remains positive and significant at the 5% level. The economic effects are somewhat reduced, though still large. A one standard deviation increase in positive information implies a decrease in underpricing of 8.2 percentage points, and a 3.2 percentage point increase for risk factor disclosure. The coefficients on venture backing, logged proceeds, and the 1999/2000 dummy are all significant and positive. The result for venture backing is difficult to understand, as venture certification should presumably lead to less, rather than more, underpricing; this implies that there is some selection effect of venture capital. The positive effect of offering size accords with either greater uncertainty regarding the issuer where insiders retain a lower stake (proceeds ceases to be significant in Column 5, which controls for insider ownership and firm size) or the need to attract more uninformed investors via a discount. The very high significance (t statistic > 8) of the 1999/2000 dummy implies that there are effects of the boom years that these specifications do not otherwise capture.
Columns III controls for all years and all 2 digit SIC codes. Because the majority of specifications in this model make use of Fama-French's 5 industrial classification scheme, there is substantial heterogeneity within Fama-French industries. Controlling for all 2 digit SIC codes provides some reassurance that this does not greatly affect the results: the coefficients for positive and negative disclosure both lose a small amount of statistical significance (although the point estimates actually grow larger in absolute magnitude), but remain significant at well over 1% and 10% respectively. An F test for all 2 digit SICs shows that they are not, as a group, close to statistical significance (Pr. > F = .97). Year controls do, however, remain significant at well beyond the 1% level.
Column IV uses the same controls as Column III, and presents an alternative specification of disclosure, namely the logged ratio of summary wordcount to risk factor wordcount. This disclosure variable allows for somewhat easier interpretation, since it encapsulates both positive and negative disclosure into one statistic. Taking a one standard deviation increase in the disclosure ratio (.56) yields a 7.3 percentage point decrease in IPO underpricing. This is still a quite large economic effect.
Columns V adds additional controls taken from SDC Platinum and Compustat (due to missing data, the number of observations is decreased). These controls are pre-IPO reported revenues (set to zero if not reported), the proportion of shares held by insiders after the offering (set to zero if not reported), whether insider-held shares are subject to a lockup, 24 and logged assets (as reported in the firm's first public annual report). I offer this specification with a couple caveats. First, many of the observations are missing, and it is not entirely clear what missing data means. SDC maintains that a missing value for these variables means that it was not reported. Assuming this is true, I have coded missing values for SDC data as zero, which is the most negative inference that an investor could draw. The financial data from Compustat also has a significant number of holes, which gives one pause as well.
In any event, with the addition of these controls in Column V, positive disclosure becomes significant at only the 5% level, while risk factor disclosure is no longer statistically significant (it is still, however, of the predicted sign). Venture backing and proceeds lose much of their significance. Of the added variables, only logged assets is even marginally statistically significant.
B. Industry and year-specific effects of disclosure
From Tables 4 and 5 above, there appears to be some variation in IPO disclosure policy, and of the effect of disclosure, by year and industry. Tables 6 and 7 below investigate interactions of industry and disclosure and of year of IPO and disclosure, respectively. As it turns out, the relation between disclosure and underpricing is more concentrated in some industries and in some years (particularly, the bubble years of 1999 and 2000). Table 6 presents a regression of IPO underpricing against industry interactions and industry controls. Column 1 gives the reduced form. Effects of disclosure appears to be concentrated in the Consumer Goods, High tech, and Other industries. The interaction effect for all three industries with positive information (logged summary wordcount) is negative, as predicted, and significant well beyond the 1% level. The coefficients of negative information are of less significance, though the signs are as predicted. Interaction with Consumer Goods is significant at only the 10% level, while the "Other Industry" interaction is significant at 1%. It is notable that there is no remaining industry effect after controlling for interactions, either individually (not shown) or as a group; this implies that while the effects of disclosure vary among different industries, there is no inherent difference in underpricing among industries once disclosure is taken into account.
A similar result obtains after adding additional controls in Column 2. The effect of positive disclosure again appears most concentrated in the Consumer Goods, High Tech, and Other industries, although the significances are not as high (5%, 5%, and 10%) respectively. There is no significant effect of the negative disclosure interactions. Again, the non-interaction industry controls are not significant individually (not shown) or as a group. Venture backing, the size of the syndicate group (logged number of underwriters), and the 1999/2000 dummy are all significant, though none of the other controls are. parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This regression controls for interactions between positive/negative information (proxied by summary wordcount/risk factor wordcount) and FamaFrench 5 industry classifications, as well as individual Fama French 5 industry effects. "Other controls" in Column (2) includes offering proceeds (logged), reported assets from the issuer's first 10-K (logged), a lockup dummy, pre-IPO reported revenues (zero if not reported), and insiders' retained share post-IPO (zero if not reported); none of these are individually significant, nor are they significant as a group. Table 7 presents interaction effect of disclosure and year of IPO upon the degree of underpricing.
Column 1 presents the reduced form model of just disclosure/year interactions and year controls. The effects of disclosure appear to be very highly concentrated in the bubble years of 1999 and 2000. Other year interactions and individual year controls are significant neither individually (not shown) nor as a group. In an alternative specification (not shown) including non-interacted measures of positive and negative disclosure, noninteracted disclosure shows no statistical significance. Thus, it appears that the overall effect of disclosure comes largely from the effect within these two years.
Column 2 controls for additional offering and issuer characteristics (venture backing, size of underwriting syndicate, size of offering, and issuer industry). This does not affect the result from Column 1; positive and negative disclosure interactions remain of the predicted sign and at 1% significance.
Column 3 presents additional controls (assets, lockup, insider retained share, and pre-IPO revenues), as well as non-interaction terms for positive and negative disclosure. The additional controls are not significant individually (not shown) or as a group. The non-interaction disclosure terms are not significant, nor are the individual year controls.
These results are consistent disclosure accounting for much of the year-by-year variation in underpricing. However, from the regressions of Table 7 , it appears that the disclosure relation may be limited to the years 1999 and 2000. To see whether this is the case, I run a regression of underpricing against disclosure, controlling for year and industry, and excluding observations from 1999 and 2000 (not shown). Positive disclosure retains 1% significance (t statistic = 3.9), though risk factor disclosure is not significant. Hence, even though disclosure effects appear especially potent in 1999 and 2000, the effect of disclosure still generalizes throughout the sample period. 
C. Discussion
In summary, the potential effect of disclosure upon IPO underpricing is strikingly large and appears to be robust to several different specifications and controls. While dfisclosure effects appear most concentrated among certain years (1999 and 2000) and certain industries (consumer goods, high-tech, and other), it appears that the relation of disclosure and underpricing is not an artifact of just a certain time period or industry.
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That is, IPO disclosure appears significantly linked to IPO underpricing, and these results are consistent with a story in which more disclosure reduces underpricing and lowers a firm's cost of capital.
These specifications cannot, however, prove causality: while they are consistent with a story in which disclosure reduces uncertainty and underpricing, they are also consistent with a scenario in which uncertainty jointly determines both the amount of disclosure and the degree of underpricing. More fundamentally, these results may be consistent with a scenario in which underpricing is not even the result of uncertainty: the correlation between disclosure and underpricing could be the result of non-informational mechanisms. Part 7 below addresses these concerns in part by first examining more direct measures of informational completeness and then by attempting to isolate causality using instruments for disclosure.
Robustness and endogeneity of disclosure-underpricing results
A. Does disclosure correspond to informational completeness? i. Disclosure and return volatility
If less disclosure results in greater informational asymmetry, we ought to see a greater variance of returns of firms that disclose less. Figure 3 presents a graph of the standard deviation of daily returns for the 250 trading days post-IPO, broken out by decile of disclosure, where disclosure is measured as the ratio of non-risk factor wordcount to risk factor wordcount. Decile 10 represents the most disclosure (in the sense of the greatest ratio of non-risk factor to risk factor disclosure), while decile 1 represents the least disclosure. It is apparent from the graph that there is a negative relation between disclosure and standard deviation of subsequent returns. By this measure, the firms with the greatest amount of disclosure have just over half the volatility of those with the least disclosure. This is consistent with prospectus disclosure as reducing uncertainty (and hence also reducing information asymmetry). Causation is, however, unclear: it could be that firms facing greater volatility of stock price (for whatever reason) choose to disclose less, perhaps for fear of subsequent legal liability. (Note that this is somewhat unlikely as a complete story, since if there is no cost to reducing disclosure, then all firms would choose to disclose zero.) And, as with the disclosure/underpricing relation, it could be that disclosure and return volatility are jointly determined by ex ante uncertainty.
In order to partially address this concern, Table 8 presents a multivariate regression with return volatility (as measured by the standard deviation of daily returns for the 250 days following the IPO) versus disclosure along with controls for offering and firm characteristics, which should proxy somewhat for ex ante uncertainty. Even with these controls, positive disclosure (logged summary wordcount) corresponds to reduced volatility of returns, while negative disclosure (risk factor wordcount) corresponds to increased volatility. Column 1 gives the reduced form. Logged summary wordcount is negative and highly significant, and logged risk factor wordcount is positive and highly significant. This is what one would predict if more disclosure does in fact reduce uncertainty. Of note is the fact that these two factors alone explain approximately 36% of the variance in the volatility dependent variable.
Column 2 controls for size of offering (proceeds), venture backing, logged number of underwriters in the syndicate, a dummy for the bubble years of 1999 and 2000, and for high tech firms (Fama French industry 3) . All of these variables should impact the degree of ex ante uncertainty regarding the offering: larger offerings have more uncertainty, more VC and underwriter backing should increase ex ante confidence, IPOs in "hot" years may be more subject to adverse selection, and high tech firms typically have greater variance of returns. Again, the coefficients on disclosure are highly significant and are of the predicted sign.
Colum 3 adds controls for all 2 digit SIC codes, reported revenues prior to the offering, financial information from the issuer's first public annual report (logged assets, liabilities, and revenues), whether insider shares were subject to a lockup, and the percentage of shares retained by insiders post-IPO. Factors such as whether the firm had pre-IPO revenues, the extent of retained insider holdings and lockups, and firm size should all tend to reduce ex ante uncertainty. While the magnitude of the coefficient on positive disclosure is reduced, it remains significant at the 1% level. Negative (risk factor) disclosure is no longer significant.
Column 4 controls for everything in Column 3 plus all year dummies. Both disclosure coefficients are of the predicted sign. Positive disclosure is significant at the 10% level, and negative disclosure is very highly significant (t statistic = 3.6).
ii. Disclosure and liquidity: bid-ask spreads and market depths
As an additional test of the informativeness of prospectus disclosure, one can examine the effect of disclosure upon post-IPO trading spreads and depths. Following Schrand & Verrecchia (2005) , I compute average spread and average depth as the averages of a firm's daily relative spread ((bid-ask)/((bid+ask)/2)) and daily dollar depth ((bid*bidsize + ask*asksize)/2) from WRDS's TAQ database. I take these measures over trading days 16 to 45 after the IPO, in order to avoid price support by underwriters in the fifteen days immediately following the IPO, and to avoid as much as possible the contaminating effect of public reports and releases made after the IPO is completed. If disclosure reduces uncertainty and corrects information asymmetry, one would expect to see that positive disclosure (summary wordcount) has a negative effect on spread and a positive effect on depth, and vice versa for negative disclosure (risk factor wordcount).
Figure 4 presents univariate analysis of spread and depth by disclosure decile, with disclosure measured as the ratio of non-risk factor disclosure to risk factor disclosure. There appears to be an effect of disclosure upon depth -more disclosure leads to greater depth, as predicted -though there is no clear effect upon spreads. Table 9 presents a multivariate analysis of the relation between disclosure and average spread/depth. Columns 1 and 2 present the reduced form, while Columns 3 and 4 control for additional offering and post-IPO characteristics. The results are mixed. For spreads (Columns 1 and 3), only negative disclosure in the reduced form model (Column 1) has the predicted effect. Things are better for depths, with positive disclosure having a positive effect (as predicted) on average depth at the 1% level in the reduced form model and 5% in the full model. It is possible that the sample period (30 trading days) is too short to give a reliable spread or depth statistic; or it could be that the time period allows too much information to enter into the market after the prospectus disclosure is made. To consider the latter possibility, I examine spreads and depths over the first 15 days in Table 9 .1 below: Table 9 .1 regresses intra-industry deviation of summary wordcount and the number of risk factors against average market depths and bid-ask spreads over the first 15 days of trading post-IPO. Here, summary wordcount (positive information) has a strongly significant positive effect on market depth, while the number of risk factors disclosed (negative information) has a strongly significant positive effect on the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. This suggests that disclosure does increase the degree of informational completeness: more disclosure leads to lower liquidity costs in the form of reduced spreads and greater market participation. Again, however, one cannot dismiss the hypothesis that baseline uncertainty determines both the level of disclosure and post-IPO liquidity.
B. Instrumental measures of disclosure [forthcoming]
While the investigation so far in this Part 6 is consistent with a story in which disclosure affects uncertainty and hence underpricing, the results are also generally consistent with being a product of uncertainty. The latter is likely to be a problem if the control variables -such as size of offering, underwriting syndicate, industry, and so ondo not adequately reflect the ex ante uncertainty as perceived by the market (or more particularly, uninformed investors in the market) at the time of the offering. In such a case, then, one can still estimate the causal effects of disclosure by identifying exogenous change in the level of disclosure. This requires isolating an instrument that correlates with disclosure, but which does not correlate with underpricing.
Identifying such an instrument is somewhat difficult. However, there are at least two likely possibilities. First, identity of issuer's counsel may introduce exogenous variation into disclosure as certain law firms may differ in drafting practices due to past experience or cultural momentum. Thus, I have gathered from the IPO prospectuses the identity of issuer's counsel, and have coded by individual counsel as well as by size and the region in which the law firm is based, following Coates' (2001) result that such attributes affect an issuing firm's corporate governance.
Second, the number of reporting segments may independently affect the amount of disclosure that the firm makes. The SEC requires firms to provide narrative disclosure on each of a firm's "operating segments." 26 A firm of the same size (as measured by assets) should have to make more disclosure if it is composed of a greater number of segments, though it is not necessarily the case that the firm is of additional complexity or subject to greater uncertainty.
These instruments allow for two stage least squares ("2SLS") regressions. In a regression of the instruments against disclosure, one estimates a linear model that predicts the level of disclosure based on the instruments. Using these predicted disclosure levels, which are exogenous to underpricing, one can then estimate the effect of exogenous disclosure upon IPO underpricing (or more direct measures of informational completeness) in a second stage regression.
If the relationship holds up in the instrumental variable regressions, this would imply that disclosure does indeed affect underpricing and the level of uncertainty surrounding an offering. This would imply, in turn, that prospectus disclosure serves a useful purpose. On the other hand, if there is no effect of disclosure upon either underpricing or measures of informational completeness, then this suggests that disclosure is more of a barometer of the available information regarding an issuer, as opposed to a conduit for conveying information for issuer to the market. Such a result would undercut the rationale for maintaining an expensive mandatory disclosure regime. Table 9 .2 below estimates a 2SLS model using issuer's counsel and operating segments as instruments for disclosure, versus IPO underpricing. Table 9 .3 below estimates a 2SLS model using the same instrumental variables against the same measures of informational completeness -volatility, bid-ask spreads, and market depths -as earlier in this Part 7.
[Tables 9.2 and 9.3 forthcoming]
B. Discussion
An examination of more direct measures of informational completeness generally supports the hypothesis that disclosure reduces uncertainty and that this in turn reduces underpricing. After controlling for several ex ante measures of risk, more disclosure is positively associated with reduced variance of returns. More disclosure also implies greater measures of liquidity -greater depth and lower spreads -though this result is somewhat less robust. While this does not refute the possibility that disclosure is determined by ex ante uncertainty, they do more directly confirm that disclosure serves an informational purpose -either providing a measure of what is already known about the firm, or else providing new information to the marketplace which reduces information asymmetry. Either case is consistent with information asymmetry theories of IPO underpricing.
[forthcoming]
Disclosure and Legal Liability
A. Disclosure and incidence of IPO-lawsuit
Why might firms disclose less, rather than more information, if this results in a higher cost of capital due to greater first day underpricing? More disclosure (and less risk factor disclosure) subjects a firm to more liability. We should expect firms, in choosing their net amount of disclosure, to balance the benefit from mitigating underpricing against the cost of potential legal action. If being cautious is of diminishing marginal benefit, then firms facing a larger exogenous risk of lawsuit should utilize more negative (less positive) disclosure, but they will still face a greater likelihood of being sued overall as this adjustment is less than complete. 27 An analogy is preventive medication: if individuals at risk for a heart attack are prescribed medication, while those who are not are not, one would expect to see individuals who take medication suffer a greater incidence of heart attack. The correlation between preventive measures and actual injury would be positive -though obviously this does not mean that taking medicine causes heart attacks. Quite to the contrary, once one controls for ex ante risk, the correlation between preventive measures and actual injury should become negative.
The data appear to bear this out. Figure 5 graphs the incidence of IPO-related lawsuit by quintile of the number of risk factor headings (e.g., quintile 5 represents the top 20% of firms in terms of number of risk factors disclosed). There is a positive relationship between risk factor disclosure and the unconditional probability of being sued in relation to the IPO. Table 10 presents a logit regression analysis of the full sample, where the dependent variable is whether the firm was sued in relation to its IPO. 28 In the reduced form model (i.e., absent controls) I find that this relation between IPO suits and disclosure exists generally. Adding controls for firm risk and post-IPO price performance, this relation reverses: more disclosure appears to lead to a greater incidence of liability. Together, this result suggests that disclosure's relationship with litigation is endogenous: more disclosure appears to increase the incidence of suit, while a greater likelihood of litigation tends to reduce disclosure.
Columns I presents the stripped down specification. Summary word count (the measure of positive information) is negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that firms that make more attractive disclosure about themselves tend to get sued less often. The number of risk factor headings is significant at the 5% level; the positive coefficient indicates that firms that make more risk factors disclosures tend to get sued more often, as Figure 5 suggests. (Generally speaking, specifications using risk factor wordcount are somewhat less significant, and have been omitted for concision.)
Columns II adds controls for year and industry. Neither positive nor negative disclosure are significant.
Column III adds controls relating to market conditions and litigation risk. 29 Notably, the sign on logged summary wordcount (the measure of positive disclosure) has become significant and positive: disclosure has a statistically significant (5%) relation with the incidence of IPO-related lawsuits. The measure of negative disclosure, the number of risk factor headings, is no longer significant.
The evidence presented in Columns I and III together is consistent with a story in which disclosure and litigation are endogenous: more disclosure increase the amount of litigation, while greater risk of litigation reduces the amount of disclosure. The specification in Column I does not control for ex ante litigation risk, and hence it is plausible to observe a negative relation between disclosure and subsequent litigation: firms at low risk of litigation tend to disclosure more, while firms at high risk tend to disclosure less. Column III does include such controls, and the relation is reversed: controlling for risk of litigation, more disclosure makes a firm more likely to be sued for in relation to its IPO. 29 These controls are: the number of firms in the issuer's 2 digit SIC code going public in the year prior to the IPO, adjusted monthly turnover of the firm's shares in the year after the IPO, the standard deviation of the issuer's returns post-IPO (measured over 250 trading days), the amount of first day underpricing, and the issuer's average share price returns post-IPO (measured over 250 trading days). 
B. Addressing endogeneity in disclosure and litigation risk
While we would expect that disclosure affects litigation risk (more disclosure gives a prospective plaintiff more to hang his hat on), expected litigation risk should also affect disclosure. That is, a strategic manager will tend to disclose less as the firm faces a higher ex ante likelihood of litigation. To more fully explore this issue of endogeneity, one can model the relationship between litigation and disclosure as the following system of equations, which allows for the identification of causal effects: The instruments for disclosure are, as discussed above in Section 6.D., number of operational segments and issuer's attorney. The instruments for litigation risk are matched share turnover, as used in Lowry & Shu (2002) , and a measure of market volatility prior to the IPO. While share turnover is somewhat dubious as a risk indicator for IPO related suits -while turnover increases the odds of a 10b-5 suit, it should, if anything lessen the ability of purchasers to sue under Section 11 -it has been used prominently in the corporate finance literature and I include it for completeness. Pre-IPO market volatility may give managers some idea of the likelihood that their share price will decline down the road, while systemic volatility should not affect disclosure standards. 
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented evidence that IPO prospectus disclosure matters to a firm's cost of public capital. The net amount of disclosure is very significantly and negatively correlated with the degree of first day underpricing. This suggests that firms that disclose less exacerbate informational asymmetries and hence have more underpricing, consistent with winner's curse and information cascade theories of IPO underpricing. Posing the question why firms would choose to disclose little given these costs, the evidence suggests that fear of litigation may play a role, in that issuers at greater risk of IPO suits disclose less positive information and more negative risk factor disclosure. Controlling for the risk of litigation, there is a positive relation between positive disclosure and liability, indicating that firms that disclose more good things about themselves face the risk of liability later on for doing so.
However, these results do not rule out endogeneity. For example, it could be that baseline uncertainty jointly determines disclosure levels and IPO underpricing, which could account for the observed correlation. Similarly, for litigation risk, while we may have a strong prior that more disclosure increases litigation risk, the OLS results do not rule out the possibility that, as in the reduced form model, more risk factor disclosure increases the risk of lawsuit. Attempts to control for the endogeneity of both disclosure and litigation risk [are forthcoming].
Thus, taken together, I present evidence that fear of litigation leads to less disclosure and less useful information making it to the marketplace, with the result of greater IPO underpricing and a higher cost of capital. While the focus of this paper is not prescriptive, such results do have implications for both Securities Act reform and for reform of the securities class action process. Particularly, it appears reducing uncertainty is important to investors, and that excessive liability can lessen disclosure and thereby may raise the cost of capital. While it may be that relaxing legal liability could result in greater disclosure to the marketplace and more efficient capital formation, this is not, however, certain: because the credibility of information may depend upon legal penalties for inaccuracy, too low a legal penalty could result in greater underpricing.
In any event, the results of this paper are highly suggestive, if not conclusive. Future drafts will address issues of causation and endogeneity directly.
